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INTRODUCTION
During a Senate campaign more than four decades ago, revelations of a
$5,000 contribution offer to Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota precipi-
tated a Senate investigation. At that time, Congress was considering legis-
lation dealing with the regulation of natural gas. The discovery of the con-
tribution offer ignited such a furor that it prompted President Eisenhower to
declare he would veto any bill relating to natural gas regulation enacted
under a cloud of suspicion.' He carried out his threat, and it was another
* Visiting Professor of Law, Nova University Law School. Former U.S. Congress-
man from Illinois (1960-1980). A.B., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Illinois
College of Law; L.L.M., Harvard Law School. President, World Federalist Association;
National Chair, Advisory Council, Center for Voting Rights and Democracy. The author
wishes to acknowledge with deep appreciation the contributions to the revisions and editing
of this Article made by Nancy Ciampa.
1. During that era, reporting of contributions was non-existent. To his great honor, a
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decade before Congress finally enacted legislation deregulating natural gas
at the wellhead. Since that time, as the costs of campaigns have increased,
the fear that campaign contributions will destroy the integrity of the legis-
lative process has grown.
2
In 1997 and the upcoming year, the focus on, and controversy over cam-
paign contributions continues.3 Although the final figures from the 1996
campaign are difficult to assemble because many contributions are still
being discovered and returned,4 it is generally accepted that between 1992
and 1996 there was a veritable explosion in campaign spending at all lev-
els, especially in federal races.5 One study estimates that contributions
during these four years rose thirty-three percent - from $1.6 billion to $2.2
billion.6
The impact of campaign finance on the regulatory process is a new twist.
The regulatory role of the federal government was extremely limited a
century ago. In fact, except for the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), very little state or federal regulation of business existed during the
period that gave birth to the age of Lochnerism7 and laissez-faire econom-
Senator who received a contribution in the form of cash in an unmarked envelope from an
anonymous donor, promptly made public what he believed was an attempt to influence his
vote.
2. See Ellen S. Miller and Micah Sifry, Move Over Big Money, WASH. POST, Apr. 7,
1997, at A17. The authors point out that, during the 1896 presidential election, the fabled
Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Mark Hanna, raised some $7 million in
direct contributions from banks, insurance companies, railroads, and other large business
interests to help William McKinley defeat William Jennings Byran. Id. They assert that in
terms of 1996 dollars the amount would equal approximately $150 million. Id.
3. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) has agreed to take up the issue of
campaign finance reform in March of 1998. See Helen Dewar, March Deadline Set for
Senate Campaign Finance Bill: Compromise Clears Way for Votes on 'Fast Track' Author-
ity, Amtrak, and FDA Legislation, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1997, at A4. The issue of cam-
paign finance reform has taken on a new twist. The focus is now on campaign contributions
emanating from foreign governments and non-U.S. citizens. See Susan Schmidt, House
Panel to Begin Hearings on Campaign Finance Abuses, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1997, at
AI0.
4. Hearings on 1996 fundraising abuses were suspended in October of 1997 by Sena-
tor Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
See Edward Walsh, Fund-Raising Hearings Are Suspended in Senate; With Change in
Deadline Unlikely, Probe Effectively Ends, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1997, at Al. Senator
Thompson, however, stated that if additional hearings were necessary he would reconvene
the Committee. See id.
5. See Eric Pianin, Money Machine: The Fund-Raising Frenzy of Campaign '96; How
Business Found Benefits in Wage Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 1I, 1997, at A8 (noting that in
1996 "corporate PACs showered House and Senate candidates with more than $77.5 million
- more than twice as much as they spent a decade ago....").
6. See Miller & Sifry, supra note 2, at A17.
7. Lochnerism, a term derived from the Supreme Court case Lochner v. New York,
[50:1
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
ics. Today, in contrast, the regulatory role of the federal government is
pervasive, indeed massive; prompting the flow of campaign contributions
and generating louder calls for reform.8
It is obvious that what seemed to be an attempt to buy congressional
votes during the Eisenhower era, involved corruption of the legislative pro-
cess, not the regulatory or administrative process, at least not directly.
With the rapid growth of the administrative state since World War II, and
the explosive expansion of the regulatory process in such new fields as the
environment, international trade and commerce, and telecommunications,
regulations have become the intense object of interest and attention by lob-
byists and contributors who formerly concerned themselves mainly with
the legislative process. It is one thing to corrupt a non-elected government
official with a bribe and quite another matter where the quid pro quo for
favorable action on legislation favored by the campaign donor is a contri-
bution from his company's political action committee (PAC). 9
I. WE CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
In a recent interview, Professor Archibald Cox, Former Solicitor General
and famed Watergate Special Prosecutor fired by then President Richard
Nixon, was asked the following: "Do you think we'll see meaningful cam-
paign finance reform soon?"'0 His reply included this chilling indictment
of our present system of campaign financing: "We can't survive as a self-
governing people if it doesn't happen."'"
I begin with this statement because it was the cover-up of Watergate and
198 U.S. 45 (1905), encompasses the idea that freedom of contract was a substantive ele-
ment of due process. Both federal and state governments were barred under the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from interfering with the employer-
employee relationship unless the laws reasonably related to the safety, health, morals or
general welfare of the public. Some 200 state laws and federal regulatory efforts were de-
clared unconstitutional during the three decades that this doctrine prevailed. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 482 (1997). But see Neb-
bia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (signaling departure from Lochner approach to social
legislation).
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247 (1996) (discussing failure of 104th Congress to reform federal
government's regulatory system in meaningful way).
9. A story that has made the rounds in Washington about the late Senator Russell
Long (D-La.) who was, for many years, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, may be
apocryphal. Senator Long is reported to have observed that when a campaign contribution
is made to a member of a committee before whom a legislative matter of concern to the do-
nor is on the current agenda, the line between a contribution and a bribe becomes vanish-
ingly small.
10. Conversation with Archibald Cox, HARv. L. BULL., Summer, 1997, at 10.
11. Id.
1998]
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its connection with illegal fund-raising activities and disbursement of hush
money out of campaign coffers that threatened the very foundation of our
constitutional government a quarter of a century ago. Now, twenty-five
years later, we are again in the deep throes of congressional hearings. 12
This time we are examining the charges and countercharges of both major
political parties regarding the raising of campaign funds for the 1994-1996
federal election cycle, especially in the November 1996 presidential race.
The voting public's deepening cynicism towards the explosion of cam-
paign spending is apparent. The most costly presidential race in history
turned out, in percentage terms, the lowest voter participation since 1924. I1
Such a statistic challenges the legitimacy of our form of self-government
- one that boasts the world's oldest democracy - a government where it
is the people who decide.
II. ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: A HOLLOW MOCKERY
This brief contribution to the Anniversary issue of the Administrative
Law Review is dedicated to the memory of the late Judge J. Skelly Wright
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals who wrote for the majority in
the 1975 decision Buckley v. Valeo.' 4 In Buckley, the court of appeals up-
held the Federal Election Campaign Act's (FECA)15 limitations on the
amount of campaign contributions a campaign could receive.' 6 Judge
Wright later authored an article discussing that decision. 7 In this truly re-
markable epistolary of his intellectual journey toward his position - that
the valid principle of "one man, one vote" was becoming, in his words, a
"hollow mockery" - he makes reference to the views of Alexis de
Tocqueville and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 18 Both understood the linkage
between genuine democracy and a self-governing democratic form of gov-
ernment; that they not only intersect, but flow together in a stream made up
of an enlightened and energized citizenry, whose tides carry us forward to-
ward a goal of ever increasing liberty. As such, in expressing my views, I
shall use their words.
Tocqueville, reflecting on his travels through America in the 1830s,
12. See Sandra Sobieraj, Clinton Presses for Reform on Campaign Fund Raising,
MiAMi HERALD, Sept. 14, 1997, at 4A (quoting President Clinton as saying that recent cam-
paign finance debate presented "a time of testing").
13. Curtis Gans, Pollyanna's America, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1997, at A19.
14. 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-41 (1994).
16. See519F.2dat843.
17. J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982).
18. See id. at 627.
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mused:
[T]he principle of the sovereignty of the people hovers over the whole political sys-
tem of the Anglo-Americans... .Each individual forms an equal part of that sover-
eignty and shares equally the government of the state... .Let us suppose that all the
citizens take a part in the government and that each of them has an equal right to do
so. Then no man is different from his fellows, and nobody can wield tyrannical
power; men will be perfectly free because they are entirely equal, and they will be
perfectly equal because they are entirely free. Democratic peoples are tending toward
that ideal. That is the completest possible form of liberty on this earth.
19
Perhaps even more telling, as Judge Wright marshals his arguments for
political equality, is his reference to John Rawls, a political philosopher of
the Twentieth Century, who observed that when wealth comes to control
the political process, the exercise of political equality by the people is im-
possible.20 Rawls, stated:
The liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value
whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantage
to control the course of public debate. For eventually these inequalities will enable
those better situated to exercise a larger influence over the development of legisla-
tion.
2 1
Pluralists, of course, would argue, or at least suggest, that the legislative
process, which stands in loco parentis to the regulatory process through
enabling legislation, does not represent individuals.22 While there is a great
measure of truth in that statement, it does not, in my opinion, detract from
the conclusion that today interest groups are using money as their chief
weapon to achieve those compromises. 23 For the most part, the goal of
19. Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 49 (J.P. Mayer, et
al., eds., 1966)).
20. See id. at 629-30.
21. Id. at 630 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (1971)).
22. See Phillip P. Frickey, Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469
(1996) (discussing different theories of legislative process, with particular criticism of tradi-
tional pluralist model). Rawls argued that instead citizens organize into diverse and cross-
cutting interest groups, which, in turn, pressure legislators into reaching compromises.
23. In March 1979, 1 testified before the House Administration Committee, and deliv-
ered a verdict on the effect of PACs on the financing of federal election campaigns. I stated:
The manner in which congressional elections are currently financed is a national dis-
grace. Special interests view campaign contributions as a way to buy into the office
of a present or future member of Congress... .A major source of [the public's] distrust
comes from the changing way in which our campaigns are being financed. More and
more political action committees...are being created and are involving themselves in
congressional elections. Their pattern of contributions, largely to incumbents, is what
causes public cynicism... .It is becoming a system of purchasing access and the ex-
pectation of legislative favors, and its time for change.
Hearings on H.R. I and Related Legislation Before the House Administration Comm., 96th
1998]
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greater political -equality is simply not on the bargaining table during the
compromise process.
Often the power of money channeled through interest groups is not de-
signed to achieve compromise. Rather, the current campaign finance sys-
tem is designed to achieve stasis - inaction which will not disturb the
status quo of those who are fairly well-off and intend to keep it that way.
The proof lies among the thousand of bills that flood the hopper in the
House but never see the light of day, let alone debate and discussion, nor
are they intended to. A subsequent section of this Article makes it clear
that in fighting its bitter rear-guard action, the tobacco industry is fighting
against, rather than for, further legislation and regulation.2 4 The same con-
clusion could be drawn from the millions of dollars business, labor, and
other interest groups contribute to campaigns.2
A number of legal scholars, led by Professor Ronald Dworkin of New
York University School of Law, have signed a statement calling for the re-
versal of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,26 which held
that political campaign expenditures are protected as free speech.27 The
statement reads in part:
We believe that the Buckley decision is wrong and should be overturned. The deci-
sion did not declare a valuable principle that we should hesitate to challenge. On the
contrary, it misunderstood not only what free speech really is but what it really means
for free people to govern themselves.
28
If there is any doubt about the principle enunciated in Mr. Karpinski's
Cong. 216 (1979) (statement of Representative John B. Anderson).
24. See discussion infra Part V.
25. Union experience with PACs arose when labor leader John L. Lewis established
Labor's Non-Partisan Political League and continued with the Committee on Political Edu-
cation (COPE). See Edwin M. Epstein, Business and Labor Under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, in POLITICS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 110
(Michael J. Malbin ed., 1980). Business became involved with PACs primarily after 1972
as a reaction to FECA. See id. at 110-11. Prior to its enactment, "[t]here was little need for
business PACs; money from business-related sources could enter in almost unlimited
amounts in the form of individual contributions by wealthy persons affiliated with corpora-
tions and other business organizations." Id. at I l. For a history of PACs in the United
States, see Edwin M. Epstein, The Emergence of Political Action Committees, in POLITICAL
FINANCE 159 (Herbert E. Alexander ed., 1979).
26. 424 U.S. 1(1976).
27. See id. at 19, n.18 ("Being free to engage in unlimited political expression subject
to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as
one desires on a single tank of gasoline.").
28. Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Gene
Karpinski, Executive Director, United States Public Interest Research Group) (emphasis
added).
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statement - that money has a crowding out effect in the legislative and
regulatory processes as candidate and office-holders are flooded with cash
- there is further proof. Donald F. Fowler, the former Democratic Na-
tional Committee Chairman, recently testified before the Senate Govern-
mental Affairs Committee that he arranged access to officials at the highest
levels of government on behalf of some of the Democratic Party's largest
donors.29 His calls even included a call to the Central Intelligence Agency
on behalf of an international oil financier, who had given a total of
$300,000 to various party organizations, and who was seeking support for
the construction of an international oil pipeline in Central Asia.30 Mr.
Fowler expressed his bland acceptance of responsibility for his actions and
said, "I believe it wholly appropriate for the head of a national party to se-
cure a meeting for a supporter with an administration official and to advo-
cate a worthy cause." 31 Proof also lies in the oft quoted assessment given
by the President's former Deputy Chief of Staff, Harold Ickes: "Washing-
ton is basically about power, access, and influence. 32
It is, of course, the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. F.E. C.,3 3 that enabled the executive
branch to become so heavily involved in raising campaign funds during the
most recent federal campaign cycle. In Colorado Republican, the Supreme
Court created a loophole in FECA by holding that political parties have a
First Amendment right to both receive and make unlimited independent
expenditures on behalf of a candidate.34 As a result, both major political
parties are soliciting "soft money" contributions, instead of "hard money"
contributions.35 Allegedly, during the 1996 elections, both presidential and
congressional candidates crossed the line between "soft money" and "hard
money."
One man, one vote refers to more than a constitutional standard based on
equipopulous voting districts. Our voting rights jurisprudence for the past
four and one-half decades has clearly embraced the proposition that there
are other ways in which an individual's right to vote can be debased and
29. See David E. Rosenbaum, 1996 Democratic ChiefAdmits Arranging Accessfor Big
Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1997, at Al.
30. See Rebecca Carr, Ex-White House Aide Vividly Recounts ... Being Pressured on
Big Donor's Behalf 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2194 (1997).
31. Rosenbaum, supra note 29, at Al.
32. Francis X. Clines, Still Offstage: lckes Has Star Billing at Hearings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1997, at A24.
33. 116 S.Ct. 2309 (1996).
34. See id. at2317.
35. Soft money is a term applied to contributions donated directly to a political party
which is later distributed to party candidates, while hard money is the term applied to ex-
penditures made to support a specific individual's campaigns.
19981
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suffer dilution. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Reynolds
V. Sims, 36 made it clear that economic or other group interests are not per-
missible factors in departing from the one man, one vote requirement for
districts which must be equal in size from the standpoint of population.
37
The evidence is simply overwhelming that the economic and individual
interests who furnished the massive amounts of these funds have enabled
major parties and their candidates to address their particular issues with an
unprecedented use of the paid media. This has shaped and controlled the
course of public debate by literally drowning out opposing views. This de-
velopment has served to make a mockery of the idea of one man, one vote.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
A. The Effect
There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence that the effect of campaign
contributions is to sway members of Congress to support positions that are
contrary to their constituents' best interests. Former Representative Dan
Hamburg of California, who ran two expensive races for the House of Rep-
resentatives, 38 wrote an amazingly candid article about the cause and effect
relationship between contributions and the legislative process.39
For example, in exchange for the maximum allowable contributions
from a union PAC, Representative Hamburg attended a White House
meeting and argued for more money for infrastructure in the budget - a
seemingly innocent request.40 Yet, he honestly conceded that his request
included the freeway-widening project for which union leaders were having
difficulty getting funding, and had expressly lobbied him for just the day
before.4
Representative Hamburg represented a district with numerous wineries
that would routinely give large checks to candidates. When, in 1993, the
Clinton administration considered raising taxes on alcohol to balance the
budget and cut the deficit, the vintners had little difficulty connecting with,and nfluncin, , . 42
and influencing, Representative Hamburg's judgment.
Representative Hamburg further recounts that when the United Parcel
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. See id. at 580 ("Citizens, not history or economic interests cast votes.").
38. Money spent in each campaign totaled approximately one million dollars. See Dan
Hamburg, Inside the Money Chase, NATION, May 5, 1997, at 23, 25.
39. Id. at 23-25.
40. See id. at 23.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 24.
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Service (UPS) faced problems with a bill on air transit fees which was be-
fore his committee, the company also influenced his judgment:
The UPS lobbyist meets you at the door of your office as you're returning from the
floor (lobbyists have an uncanny knack for finding members and waylaying them).
He states his case. He's a nice guy, he sounds authoritative on the subject. You're in-
clined to say, "[fline I'll be glad to support your position" or at least, "I can't say how
I'll vote but I think what you say has a lot of merit." The fact that this person handed
you two checks for $5,000 over the past months certainly helps seal the deal.
43
I can relate to that, of course, from my own personal experience of many
years past,44 in an era when, although the financial costs of campaigns were
a fraction of what they are today, the same temptations existed. One rec-
ollection involving a former colleague, who shall go unnamed, stands out
in my memory. The roll was being called on an agricultural bill involving
increased price supports for dairy farmers. My friend represented an en-
tirely urban area; a large city whose residents would feel the results of a fa-
vorable vote on the legislation in the form of higher milk prices at the su-
permarket. He lamented to me, "how can I not vote for this bill when the
milk producers' lobby just gave me $5,000 for my next campaign?" He did
vote for the bill, it became law, and his constituents paid the higher prices.
This was not, and is not, uncommon.
Some years ago a citizens' lobby, Common Cause, then headed by Pro-
fessor Archibald Cox, whose remarks on the need for campaign finance re-
form began this Article,45 published an article discussing the plight of many
members of Congress who must spend exorbitant amounts of money to get
elected and rely on PACs to bail them out.46 Members must borrow, quite
literally, hundreds of thousands of dollars to run for Congress, and publicly
admit their inability to pay off that indebtedness during the term for which
they were elected. 47 It is these debt-burdened members who attract the in-
terests of PACs. As an example, in a letter of invitation to a debt retire-
ment fundraiser for a newly elected member of Congress - a member of a
committee vital to their interest - top officials of the defense industry
openly welcomed the member as a "valuable ally., 48 The cause and effect
43. Id.
44. The author served ten terms in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1961 to
1981.
45. See supra Part 11.
46. Peter Overby, Run Now, Pay Later: Burdened with Campaign Debt, New Lawmak-
ers Quickly Learn to do Business, Washington style, COMMON CAUSE, Mar./Apr. 1991, at
14.
47. See id. at 14-15. For example, in the 102d Congress, the combined indebtedness of
freshmen members totaled nearly $3.1 million. See id at 14.
48. Id. at 16.
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connection with the legislative process is abundantly clear. There is very
little subtlety involved here. The indebted candidate had clearly taken po-
sitions favorable to maintaining a high level of defense expenditures. He
was now in a strategic position to shape legislation to that end. By hosting
this debt retirement party, an implicit bargain of this continued financial
support was being struck.
All of these are examples of how unlimited campaign contributions
shape the legislative process to the detriment of constituents. The effect
becomes clear to individuals who see that money makes the decisions
rather than concerns over a district's best interests.
B. The Cause
1. EPA Regulations
More recently, the battle has raged over whether regulations promul-
gated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air
Act are so draconian in their impact on industry as to be economically dis-
astrous.49 The new limits on smog and emissions of particulate matter
could have a dramatic effect on auto-makers, truckers, petrochemical com-
panies, and utility companies, especially those located in the Midwestern
states who rely heavily on coal. Even before the regulations were an-
nounced, all of these groups stated that Congress would be one of the chief
targets in their efforts to delay, limit, or kill the new regulations.50 Such
efforts are recognized and may have an effect. Even in hailing the new
regulations as a victory for cleaner air, a lead editorial in the New York
Times acknowledged, "the battle now shifts to Congress, which has the
power to overturn the new regulations. Industry lobbyists are out in force
and the administration will need all its weapons to resist them."51 It is un-
derstandable that environmentalists have repeatedly expressed their fears
that as regulations evolve those who have cultivated relationships with the
regulators will get better seats at the table.
It is clear that the administration will need to have its weapons ready in
order to combat foes such as the Midwestern and Southern utilities that
burn soft coal and give soft money. In the 1996 election cycle, these or-
ganizations' PAC and soft money contributions totaled over $6.65 mil-
49. See Air Quality Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation; Various States;
Air Quality Planning Purposes; Designation Areas, 62 Fed. Reg. 34,405-23 (1997) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
50. See Heather Dewar, Clinton Backs Tougher Air Standards: Industries Say They'll
Fight Proposed New Rules in Congress, MIAMI HERALD, June 26, 1997, at A6.
51. A Victory for Cleaner Air, N.Y. TIMEs, June 26, 1997, at A26.
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lion.5 2 John Dingell (D-Mich.), the former chairman, now ranking minority
member, and still extremely powerful member of the House Commerce and
Energy Committee, was the largest single recipient of their contributions,
receiving a total of $69,000.53 To be sure, the air pollution regulations have
drawn the ire of Mr. Dingell, a forty-three year veteran of the House from a
Michigan district in the environs of the "Motor City," who has been able to
keep his seat precisely because he is an acknowledged and indefatigable
spokesperson for the automobile industry. 4 Mr. Dingell has already
elected to support legislation that would delay the proposed EPA rule for
four years. 5 In addition, he has remarked that "the [new rule] will not im-
prove the air but will have an appalling effect on investment. 56 Further,
automobile manufacturers and dealers gave a total of $4,191,365 in the
1996 election cycle to Mr. Dingell, as well as other leading congressional
opponents of the EPA regulations. 7
Other powerful opponents of the EPA regulations who use campaign
contributions to shape the political process are found in the business com-
munity. In particular, the National Association of Manufacturers stated
that the opposition will continue lobbying Congress in an attempt to force a
showdown with the Clinton administration over the issue. 58 Its member-
ship umbrella includes some of the most powerful industry and trade
groups in the country, all of whom are fully capable of mustering the finan-
cial muscle to affect targeted campaigns.
2. Labor Regulations
Regulations issued by the Department of Labor on Ergonomics also
proved to be a controversial issue in the 104th Congress.59 These regula-
tions sought to effect changes in the workplace so that workers interact
more efficiently and safely with the equipment they use.60 The UPS, wor-
52. See NANCY WATZMAN, ET AL., CASHING IN: A GUIDE TO MONEY, VOTES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 15 (1997) (discussing special interests and their re-
spective campaign contributions).
53. See id. at 15.
54. See Cindy Skrzycki, GOP's Best Shot at Curbing EPA: A Democrat Named Ding-
ell, WASH. POST, July 18, 1997, at G1, G8.
55. Id. at GI. See H.R. 1984, 105th Cong. (1997) (creating four-year moratorium on
establishment of new standards for ozone and fine particulate matter under Clean Air Act
and its 1990 Amendments).
56. Skrzycki, supra note 54, at G8.
57. See WATZMAN, supra note 52, at 18.
58. See Dewar, supra note 50.
59. Ergonomic Protection Standard, 60 Fed. Reg. 23,572-73 (1995) (proposed May 8,
1995).
60. See id.
1998]
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ried about the regulations' possible effect on their competitiveness, despite
the linkage of the regulations to the health and safety of workers,6' lobbied
extensively against them. At the same time, UPS increased its contribu-
tions to congressional candidates, becoming one of the top contributing
PACs registered with the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). 62
3. Technology Exports and Foreign Contributions
Technology exports, the subject of extensive regulation by the federal
government, have come under scrutiny as a result of our electoral process.
The United States Department of Commerce is heavily engaged in export
promotion for which there is a very important constituency in this country.
At the same time, the Department of Commerce is the enforcement arm of
the government, regulating sensitive technology. Several recent technol-
ogy control decisions by the Department of Commerce have come under
attack by Republicans in light of the Clinton campaign's alleged receipt of
foreign campaign contributions.
Specifically, in May 1997, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), referred to what he alleged
were "questionable decisions" made by the Department of Commerce in
approving the sale of American technology to China.63 It was alleged that
foreign, rather than domestic, contributions were influencing congressional
action and the regulatory process.64 Foreign contributions are, of course,
illegal, whether to a presidential campaign or to campaigns for the House
and Senate. Nevertheless, the inquiry made by Chairman Hyde, "whether
improper outside influence was brought to bear on administrative officials
- including the President - and if that influence.. .resulted in decisions
and policies that have liberalized the transfer of defense related technolo-
gies" was accompanied by the request "that [these allegations] receive full
61. A government report shows that UPS had more penalty violations under the Occu-
pational Health and Safety Act than any other federal contractor. UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH: VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY AND HEALTH REGULATIONS BY FEDERAL
CONTRACTORS, GAO-HEHS-96-157, at 140 (Aug. 23, 1996).
62. See WATZMAN, supra note 52, at 35. UPS gave a total of $1,491,309 in PAC
money and $146, 025 in soft money in 1996. See id
63. See Jeff Gerth, Lawmakers Question Loosening of Technology Export Controls,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1997, at A19. See also Apprehension of Tainted Money Act of 1997:
Hearings on H.R. 1494 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 28-48 (1997) (discussing campaign contributions of
foreign nationals). Sales involved equipment ranging from supercomputers to machine
equipment used in the manufacture of aircraft, jet engine technology, and highly sophisti-
cated telecommunication equipment. See id
64. See Gerth, supra note 63, at A 19.
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scrutiny in the context of the Justice Department's investigation of cam-
paign finance improprieties.
'
,
65
Clearly, campaign finance improprieties need to be addressed. How-
ever, this is not the only issue. Obviously there is a need to change a sys-
tem which saw $2.7 billion in political campaign contributions during the
most recent election cycle.66 Such a system undermines the legislative and
regulatory process, as well as public integrity.
IV. THE MINIMUM WAGE AND TAX BREAKS - CONNECTIONS TO
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
One criticism of a system of public financing of elections is that it un-
fairly forces taxpayers to absorb the expense. This is not an article de-
signed to provide the entire rationale for excluding all private monies and
substituting a system of public financing; although it is something which I
have come to deeply believe is the only truly comprehensive reform for our
present system.67
Nevertheless, in our examination of the present system, it is important to
point out that the legislation passed as a result of special interest pressure
often results in added costs to taxpayers. The passage of legislation that
increased the minimum wage is an example. While saving American busi-
ness and industry huge sums of money, the legislation will cost the Ameri-
can taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars when computed over the next
decade. How did this happen? Simply by the extension of tax breaks or
tax expenditures.
The Washington Post reports the following estimates of lost revenue
over the next ten years from tax breaks and tax expenditures contained in
the minimum wage bill:
1. Permitting United States corporations operating in Puerto Rico to continue quali-
fying for Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 936 tax credits.
Cost: $18 billion.
Primary beneficiaries: pharmaceutical companies, computer and electronic manufac-
turers, and soft drink companies.68
65. Id.
66. See Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The System Cracks Under the Weight of
Cash; Candidates, Parties and Outside Interests Dropped a Record $2.7 Billion, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al, A20.
67. Reform would surely require some ceiling on spending which, under the present
state of the law as enunciated in Buckley, could only be accomplished by voluntary accep-
tance of spending limitations by the candidates.
68. See Eric Pianin, How Business Found Benefits in Wage Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 11,
1997, at Al, A8.
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2. Changes in pension law.
Cost: $6 billion.
Primary beneficiaries: members of the National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses (NFIB) representing small business, the retail industry, and manufacturers.
69
3. Increasing the amount of depreciation on equipment purchased by small business
the first year from $17,000 to $25,000.
Cost: $4.7 billion.
Primary beneficiaries: members of the NFIB.
70
4. Reducing from 39 years to 15 years the time permitted to convenience stores
which also pump gas to depreciate the cost of the store.
Cost: $452 million.
Primary beneficiaries: members of National Convenience Stores.
71
5. Repeal of the United States tax on so-called "excess passive assets" held by for-
eign subsidiaries of United States companies.
Cost: $427 million.
Primary beneficiaries: multi-national corporations including Hewlett-Packard, John-
son & Johnson, and Amway.
72
6. Expansion of the "tip credit" to pizzerias and other businesses that deliver food.
Cost: $165 million.
Primary beneficiaries: Pizza Hut, Domino's Pizza, and Godfather's Pizza.
73
There is a connection between these tax breaks and the financing of po-
litical campaigns. It is estimated that in the previous election cycle, which
included passage of the legislation increasing the minimum wage, more
than $36 million in PAC money went to members of the House and Senate
tax-writing committees.74 The Republicans enjoyed a $4.2 million advan-
tage over the Democrats in contributions of $200 or more.75 But did these
contributions have an impact on the political process? Did they effect
changes in the law to the advantage of some particular and identifiable spe-
cial interests? Clearly they did. Did these changes cost the taxpayer via
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id
74. See Pianin, supra note 68, at A8.
75. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 10 MYTHS ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS 7
(1995).
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the revenues that were lost to the Treasury? Obviously they did. A current
member of Congress, Representative Mel Levine (D-Cal.) summed it up
very well, "[o]n the tax side, the appropriations side, the subsidy side, and
the expenditure side, decisions are clearly weighed and influenced
by... who has contributed to the candidates .... The price that the public pays
for this process, whether it [is] in subsidies, taxes, or appropriations, is
quite high.
76
V. THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION V. TOBACCO
In this segment of my examination into the effects of campaign finance
on the legislative and regulatory process, the focus is on an industry that,
over the years, has consistently been listed among the largest donors to po-
litical campaigns. According to a report by the Center for Responsive
Politics, the tobacco industry, during the 1996 election cycle, spent a total
of $7,911,979. 7" Of that sum, it is estimated that eighty-eight percent was
disbursed through company PACs and only twelve percent contributed by
individuals. 78 The report also makes the important point that the tobacco
industry does not rely solely on direct political contributions. 79 Rather, the
tobacco industry gives generously to conservative think tanks and advocacy
organizations, especially those espousing a libertarian pro-market point of
view.80 For example, Phillip Morris was a major funder of Contributions
Watch, a non-profit group conducting state-level research on money and
politics which recently released a major study implicating political contri-
butions from trial lawyers - one of Phillip Morris's arch enemies.81 These
contributions are evidence that the threat to the integrity of the political
process can take many forms.
In 1995, David Kessler, head of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), wrote a letter to the American Heart Association implying that the
FDA might attempt to regulate tobacco products. In response, the tobacco
industry contributed more than $1.5 million in PAC money and "soft"
money to support congressional candidates and national parties in the first
half of 1995.82 In fact, Phillip Morris and Brown Williamson "were among
76. MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK
ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS 89 (1995).
77. See WATZMAN, supra note 52, at 39.
78. See id. at 43.
79. See id. at 38-39.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 39.
82. See Margaret A. Boyd, Butt Out! Why the FDA Lacks Jurisdiction to Curb Smoking
of Adolescents and Children, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY. 169, 176 (1996) (citing
The Senate Campaign Spending Limits on Election Reform Act of 1995: Hearings on S.
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the top soft-money givers."83
These contributions obviously paid off. After the 1996 elections, the
Republicans retained control of Congress and, consequently, the chairs of
the various committees continued to be Republican. Before the Republican
takeover in the 104th Congress, Representative Waxman (D-Cal.), a sup-
porter of tobacco regulation, chaired the Health and Environment subcom-
mittee. Following the Republican takeover in January 1995, and after the
tobacco money had a chance to exert its influence, Representative Thomas
J. Bliley, Jr., (R-Va.), who represents the state that is home of the nation's
largest tobacco companies, became chair of the full House Committee on
Commerce and Energy - the committee to which all proposed bills relat-
ing to tobacco regulation were referred.84 Representative Bliley quickly
announced that he would block further attempts by the FDA to regulate
cigarettes.8 5
Ironically, in 1996, after the fallout from tobacco industry leaks and
whistle blowers, the tobacco industry became so controversial that all bills
86 de
relating to tobacco regulation were buried in committee. But this does
not mean, or even suggest, that the tobacco industry's efforts to thwart both
legislation and further regulation were abandoned. To the contrary, as it
lobbies Congress for approval of the proposed global settlement money, the
tobacco industry continues to pour money into the political campaign cof-
fers. In fact, FEC reports compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics
show that leading tobacco industry PACs gave $566,721 to key lawmakers
in the first half of 1997.7 Four fifths of that total went to Republican
Senators and House members, including Representative Thomas J. Bliley,
and the three top House leadership posts on the majority side of the aisle:
Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), G.O.P. Conference Chair, John Boehner
(R-Ohio), and Majority Whip, Tom DeLay (R-Tex.).8 1
Despite the tobacco industry's efforts during 1995, the FDA issued re-
lated regulations in 1996 that were, by and large, upheld during the indus-
1219 Before the Senate Rules Committee, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Ann McBride,
President, Common Cause)).
83. Id. at 176 n.42 (quoting Penny Loeb et al., The Greening of America, Candidates
Will Spend More Money Than Ever to Buy Voters, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 2, 1996,
at 34, 35).
84. See Peter Bynum, A Stare Decisis Barrier to Regulating Cigarettes as Drugs, 12
J.L. & POL. 365 (1996).
85. See id.
86. See Michael Whately, Note, The FDA v. Joe Camel: An Analysis of the FDA's At-
tempt to Regulate Tobacco and Tobacco Products Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, 22 J. LEGIS. 121, 134-35 (1996).
87. See Tobacco Dollars Flow to GOP Lawmakers Key to a Settlement, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 1, 1997, § 1, at 4.
88. See id.
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try's legal challenge in 1997.89 Support for the complete elimination of ag-
ricultural programs aimed at tobacco farmers, however, has been sup-
planted by the far more modest effort to gradually phase out tobacco subsi-
dies along with those of other agricultural commodities.
Although the evidence is admittedly, as in many other areas discussed,
anecdotal rather than empirical, I believe it points to the power of money in
politics. Specifically, it points to the ability of special interests, like the to-
bacco industry, to hamstring and delay regulatory efforts, fending off the
passage of legislation damaging to their economic future. This is accom-
plished by contacts maintained with key committee chairs and ranking
members of the House and Senate. The record is indisputably clear -
these key players can assist with blocking action which will delay, if not
entirely defeat, proposals the industry regards as unfriendly and injurious.
The recent upending of a $50 billion tax break designed to cushion the
impact of the $368.5 billion global tobacco settlement between a number of
State Attorney Generals and four major tobacco companies, inserted almost
stealthily into the so-called balanced budget compromise between the
President and Congress, was hailed as a stinging rebuke to the industry.
90
This rebuke, however, should not cause us to forget the years the industry
successfully used the power of money to defeat proposed regulations and
legislation they believed was detrimental to their goals. It should not be
forgotten that in 1994 the industry spent $4.83 billion on advertising that
could be taken as a tax deduction.9' This subsidy or, properly labeled, tax
expenditure, has returned their political contributions to them a hundred-
fold. There is no indication, save for the restrictions on advertising de-
signed to capture the youth market, that this subsidy will not continue.92
VI. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION - PAC MONEY
INFLUENCES MORE THAN THE LEGISLATURE
The effects of special interest or PAC money do more than influence
legislative acts and legislators. They affect how legislators influence ad-
ministrators, regulators and their regulations, something of a trickle down
effect. While addressed indirectly, the previous sections of the Article
demonstrate that when special interests attempt to control the flow of leg-
islative action, there is a further effect. They also seek to influence the
89. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding FDA has
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products).
90. See Ceci Connolly & John E. Yang, Like Senate, House Votes to Repeal $50 Bil-
lion Tax Breakfor Tobacco Firms, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1997, at A7.
91. See WATZMAN, supra note 52, at 38.
92. See Whately, supra note 86, at 128.
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oversight functions. For example, an interesting and provocative study of
the legislative oversight of Congress and its relationship with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), points out that the failure of Con-
gress to act is often what the broadcasting and telecommunications indus-
tries desire most.93 The article states, "[tjhis legislative inertia is neither
unusual nor surprising. Congress often prefers policy-making through
oversight to avoid the pitfalls of substantive legislation. " 94 It goes on to
quote a former Commissioner who said, "[i]t is a poor dog indeed that does
not know his master."
95
This is far from a recent or singular phenomenon. House Speaker Sam
Rayburn (D-Tex.) gave this advice to President John F. Kennedy's choice
for FCC Chairman, Newton Minow: "Just remember one thing son. Your
agency is an arm of Congress; you belong to us. Remember that and you'll
be all right."96 In the same vein and at a much later date, two Senators re-
emphasized this belief. Former Senator Robert Packwood (R-Or.) said to
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, "[y]ou are a creature of Congress and you
attempt to administer... [the] laws in accordance with what you think Con-
gress has intended."97 Even more recently, a former Chairman and now
ranking minority member of the Senate Commerce Committee, Senator
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), warned FCC nominees that "the Commission
must follow our lead.. .you folks take an oath to regulate not deregulate."9 8
It does not take a leap of faith to connect the impact of money contributed
to congressional candidates to the regulatory agencies answering to them.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by quoting, with approval, the late Judge J. Skelly
Wright's most basic objection to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley.99
Specifically, the decision impedes progress toward the goal of equality
through law. This fear is supported by "[t]he growing impact of concen-
trated wealth on the political process, and the glaring inequalities in politi-
93. Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 147 (1993).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 149 (quoting Glenn 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission:
An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 172 (1978)).
96. Id. at 148-49 (quoting ERWIN G. KRASNOW, ET. AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST
REGULATION 89 (3d ed. 1982)).
97. Id. at 149 (quoting Joint Hearings, The Universal Telephone Service Preservation
Act of 1993, 98th Cong. 67 (1983)).
98. Id. (quoting Congress Asserts Its Dominion over FCC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 7,
1989, at 27).
99. See supra Part 11.
[50:1
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
cal campaign resources."' 00
The prosperity of the 1990s has only served to widen the gulf between
those on the upper rungs of the economic ladder and the rest of us. A study
of the increasing inequality in our society provides abundant statistical data
to show that, as this decade began, inequality was at a sixty-year high, with
thirty-nine percent of total household wealth controlled by the top one per-
cent of the wealth holders. 10' If the focus is placed on the financial wealth,
the richest one percent owned forty-eight percent of the total. 0 2 In his for-
ward to Wolfs report, Richard C. Leone offers the chilling observation that
in mid-decade there is public frustration and acute anger about representa-
tive democracy.1 3 It is my conclusion that policy changes are needed to
redress concerns about our democracy and that such changes inevitably in-
volve both the legislative and regulatory processes. Both clearly show the
results of being seriously affected by our present regime of campaign fi-
nance. The words with which Judge Wright closed his opinion in Buckley,
which, unfortunately, were ignored by the Supreme Court, were eerily pro-
phetic of our present situation:
Our democracy has moved a long way from the town hall, one man, one vote con-
ception of the Framers. Politics has become a growth industry and a way of life for
millions of Americans. The corrosive influence of money blights our democratic
processes. We have not been sufficiently vigilant... as we moved from the town halls
to today's quadrennial Romanesque political extravagances, that politics is neither an
end in itself nor a means for subverting the will of the people.
10 4
100. Wright, supra note 17, at 645. See also Colloquia on Campaign Finance Reform:
Law and Politics, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 161 (1994) (discussing problem of unlimited cam-
paign contributions and constitutional implications of campaign finance reform); Jamin B.
Raskin & John Bonfianz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Demo-
cratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994) (arguing in favor of com-
plete public financing of congressional campaigns).
101. See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF
WEALTH IN AMERICA 7 (1995).
102. See id.
103. Id. at v.
104. 519 F.2d 821, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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